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a b s t r a c t 
Inductive Venn-ABERS predictors (IVAPs) are a type of probabilistic predictors with the theoretical guar- 
antee that their predictions are perfectly calibrated. In this paper, we propose to exploit this calibration 
property for the detection of adversarial examples in binary classification tasks. By rejecting predictions 
if the uncertainty of the IVAP is too high, we obtain an algorithm that is both accurate on the original 
test set and resistant to adversarial examples. This robustness is observed on adversarials for the under- 
lying model as well as adversarials that were generated by taking the IVAP into account. The method 
appears to offer competitive robustness compared to the state-of-the-art in adversarial defense yet it is 
computationally much more tractable. 
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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0. Introduction 
Modern machine learning methods are able to achieve excep-
ional empirical performance in many classification tasks [1,2] .
owever, they usually give only point predictions : a typical ma-
hine learning algorithm for classification of, say, images from the
mageNet data set [3] will output only a single label given any
mage without reporting how accurate this prediction is. In com-
lex domains such as medicine, it is highly desirable to have not
ust a prediction but a measure of confidence in this prediction
s well. Many state-of-the-art machine learning methods provide
ome semblance of such a measure by transforming their inputs
nto vectors of probabilities over the different possible outputs and
hen selecting as the point prediction the output with the high-
st probability. Usually, these probabilities are obtained by first
raining a scoring classifier which assigns to each input a vector
f scores, one score per class. These scores are then turned into
robabilities via some method of calibration . The most popular cal-
bration method is Platt’s scaling [4] , which fits a logistic sigmoid
o the scores of the classifiers. 
Contrary to popular belief, however, the probability vectors that
esult from methods such as Platt’s scaling cannot be reliably inter-∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Applied Mathematics, Computer Sci- 
nce and Statistics, Ghent University, Ghent 90 0 0, Belgium. 
E-mail addresses: jonathan.peck@ugent.be (J. Peck), bart.goossens@ugent.be (B. 
oossens), yvan.saeys@ugent.be (Y. Saeys). 
 
a  
c  
c  
t  
p  
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 
925-2312/© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article
Please cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 reted as measures of confidence [5] . The phenomenon of adver-
arial manipulation illustrates this problem: for virtually all current
achine learning classifiers, it is possible to construct adversarial
xamples [6] . These are inputs which clearly belong to a certain
lass according to human observers and which are highly similar
o inputs on which the model performs very well. Despite this,
he model misclassifies the adversarial example and assigns a very
igh probability to the resulting (incorrect) label. In fact, the in-
uts need not even be similar to any natural input; machine learn-
ng models will also sometimes classify unrecognizable inputs as
elonging to certain classes with very high confidence [7] . Fig. 1
hows examples both of imperceptible adversarial perturbations as
ell as unrecognizable images which are classified as familiar ob-
ects with high confidence. These observations clearly undermine
he idea that one can use such calibrated scores as measures of
odel confidence. It begs the question: 
Do there exist machine learning algorithms which yield prov-
ably valid measures of confidence in their predictions? If so,
could these models be used to detect adversarial manipulation
of input data? 
The answer to the first question is known to be affirmative: the
lgorithms in question are called conformal predictors [8–10] . Our
ontribution here is to show that such valid confidence measures
an in fact be used to detect adversarial examples. In particular,
here exist methods which can turn any scoring classifier into a
robabilistic predictor with validity guarantees; this construction isunder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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Fig. 1. Illustrations of adversarial and fooling images. These examples highlight the fact that the confidence scores output by deep neural network classifiers are unreliable. 
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 known as an inductive Venn-ABERS predictor or IVAP [11] . By mak-
ing use of the confidence estimates output by the IVAPs, many
state-of-the-art machine learning models can be made robust to
adversarial manipulation. 
1.1. Related work 
The reliability of machine learning techniques in adversarial
settings has been the subject of much research for a number
of years already [12–15] . Early work in this field studied how
a linear classifier for spam could be tricked by carefully crafted
changes in the contents of spam e-mails, without significantly al-
tering the readability of the messages. More recently, Szegedy et al.
[14] showed that deep neural networks also suffer from this prob-
lem. Since this work, research interest in the phenomenon of ad-Please cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 ersarial examples has increased substantially and many attacks
nd defenses have been proposed [6,16,17] . The defenses can be
roadly categorized as follows: 
• Detector methods [18–21] . These defenses construct a detector
which augments the underlying classification model with the
capability to detect whether an input is adversarial or not. If
the detector signals a possible adversarial, the model prediction
is considered unreliable on that instance and the classification
result is flagged. 
• Denoising methods [22–25] . Here, the goal is to restore the ad-
versarial examples to their original, uncorrupted versions and
then perform classification on these cleaned samples. 
• Other methods [6,22,26–28] . Another class of defenses per-
forms neither explicit detection nor filtering. Rather, the aim is
to make the model inherently more robust to manipulation viaadversarial manipulation using inductive Venn-ABERS predictors, 
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g  data augmentation, regularization, modified optimization algo-
rithms or special architectures. 
Despite the large number of defenses that have been proposed
o far, at the time of this writing only one technique is generally
ccepted as having any noticable effect [29] : adversarial training
27,28] . However, even this method currently has too limited suc-
ess. The Madry defense [27] , for instance, achieves less than 50%
dversarial accuracy on the CIFAR-10 data set [30] even though
tate-of-the-art clean accuracy is over 95% [31] . Moreover, many
ecently proposed defenses suffer from a phenomenon called gra-
ient masking [32] . Here, the defense protects the model against
dversarials by obfuscating its gradient information. This is com-
only done by introducing non-differentiable components such as
andomization or JPEG compression. However, such tactics only
ender the model robust against gradient-based attacks which cru-
ially rely on this information to succeed. Attacks that do not need
radients or that can cope with imprecise approximations (such as
PDA [32] or black-box attacks [33,34] ) will not be deterred by gra-
ient masking defenses. 
We are not the first to consider the hypothesis that adver-
arial examples are due to faulty confidence measures. Most ex-
sting research in this area has focused on utilizing the uncer-
ainty estimates provided by Bayesian deep learning [35] , espe-
ially Monte Carlo dropout [36–38] and other stochastic regular-
zation techniques [5] . On the other hand, our approach is decid-
dly frequentist and hence differs significantly from this related
ork. We are not aware of much other work in this area that is
lso frequentist (e.g. Grosse et al. [20] ), as the field of deep learn-
ng (and model uncertainty in particular) appears to be primarily
ayesian. Although significant progress is being made [39] , scaling
he Bayesian methods to state-of-the-art deep neural networks re-
ains an open problem. The Bayesian approach of integrating over
eighted likelihoods also suffers from certain pathologies which
ay diminish its usefulness in the adversarial setting [40] . It is our
ope that the method detailed here, which draws upon the power-
ul framework of conformal prediction [9] , can serve as a scalable
nd effective alternative to Bayesian deep learning. 
The defense we propose in this work falls under the category of
etector methods. We are well-aware of the bad track record that
hese methods have: for example, Carlini and Wagner [41] evaluate
any recently proposed adversarial detector methods and find that
hey can be easily bypassed. However, by following the advice of
arlini and Wagner [41] and Athalye et al. [32] in the evaluation of
ur detector, we hope to show convincingly that our method has
he potential to be a strong, scalable and relatively simple defense
gainst adversarial manipulation. In particular, we test our detector
n adversarial examples generated using existing attacks that take
he detector into account as well as a novel white-box attack that
s specifically tailored to our defense. We conclude that the defense
e propose in this work remains robust even when the attacks are
dapted to the defense and it appears to be competitive with the
efense proposed by Madry et al. [27] . 
The present work is an extension of our ESANN 2019 submis-
ion [42] . The main additions are as follows: 
• Include the Zeroes vs ones data set. 
• Perform an ablation study to test the sensitivity of the IVAP to
its hyperparameters. 
• Evaluate the defense in the  2 norm as well instead of only  ∞ .
• The discussions of the results has been significantly extended. 
• We have released a reference implementation on GitHub 1 . 
• Include qualitative examples of adversarials produced by our
white-box attack. 
1 https://github.com/saeyslab/binary-ivap a
Please cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 .2. Organization 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 pro-
ides the necessary background about supervised learning, con-
ormal prediction and IVAPs which will be used in the sequel.
ection 3 describes the defense mechanism which we propose for
he detection of adversarial inputs. This defense is experimentally
valuated on several tasks in Section 4 . Experimental comparisons
o the Madry defense are carried out in Section 5 . Section 6 con-
ains the conclusion and avenues for future work. The code for our
eference implementation can be found at 
https://github.com/saeyslab/binary-ivap 
. Background 
We consider the typical supervised learning setup for classi-
cation. There is a measurable object space X and a measurable
abel space Y . We let Z = X × Y . There is an unknown probabil-
ty measure P on Z which we aim to estimate. In particular, we
ave a class of X → Y functions H and a data set S = { (x i , y i ) | i =
 , . . . , m } of i.i.d. samples from P . Our goal is to find a function in
which fits the data best: 
f  = argmin f∈H R S ( f ) . 
ere, R S is the empirical risk 
 S ( f ) = 1 
m 
m ∑ 
i =1 
 (x i , y i , f ) , 
here  is the loss function . In principle, this can be any non-
egative X × Y ×H → R function. Its purpose is to measure how
close” the function f is to the ground-truth y i locally at the point
 i . Our objective is to find a minimizer f 
 in H for the average of
he loss over the data set S . For k -ary classification, a commonly
sed loss function is the log loss 
 log (x, y, f ) = − log p y (x ; f ) . 
ere, p y ( x ; f ) is the probability that f assigns to class y for the input
 . Ideally, for a discriminative model this should be equal to the
onditional probability Pr [ y | x ] under the measure P . In the case
f a scoring classifier , these probabilities are computed by fitting a
coring function g to the data followed by a calibration procedure
 . The final classification is then computed as 
f (x ) = argmax i =1 , ... ,k s i (g(x )) . (1)
n the case of Platt’s scaling [4] , which is in fact a logistic regres-
ion on the classifier scores, s i is the softmax function 
 i (z) = 
exp (w ᵀ  
i 
z + b i ) ∑ 
j exp (w ᵀ
 
j 
z + b j ) 
. 
ere, w i and b i are learned parameters. 
.1. Conformal prediction 
It is known [5,36] that the calibrated scores produced by scor-
ng classifiers such as (1) cannot actually be used as reliable esti-
ates of the conditional probability Pr [ y | x ] : it is possible to gen-
rate inputs for any given classifier such that the model consis-
ently assigns high probability to the wrong classes. It makes sense,
hen, to look for a type of machine learning algorithm which has
rovable guarantees on the confidence of its predictions. This leads
s naturally to the study of conformal predictors [8] , which hold ex-
ctly this promise. 
In general, a conformal predictor is a function  which, when
iven a confidence level ε ∈ [0, 1], a bag 2 of instances B =2 A bag or multiset is a collection of objects where the order is unimportant (like 
 set) and duplicates are allowed (like a list). 
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3 One might even use Bayesian methods in the computation of 
. In particular, 

 might be computed using integration over weighted likelihoods determined by a 
parametric model together with some prior. This combination of Bayesian inference 
with frequentist methods has been called Frasian inference [43] .  z 1 , . . . , z n  and a new object x ∈ X , outputs a set ε (B, x ) ⊆ Y . In-
tuitively, this set contains those labels which the predictor believes
with at least 1 − ε confidence could be the true label of the input
sample based on the bag of examples given to it. These predictors
must satisfy two properties [8,10] : 
1. Nestedness. If ε1 ≥ ε2 then ε 1 (B, x ) ⊆ ε 2 (B, x ) . 
2. Exact validity. If the true label of x is y , then y ∈ ε( B, x ) with
probability at least 1 − ε. 
The exact validity property is too much to ask from a deter-
ministic predictor [8] . Instead, the algorithms we consider here
are only conservatively valid . Specifically, let ω = z 1 , z 2 , . . . be an
infinite sequence of samples from an exchangeable distribution P .
A distribution is said to be exchangeable if for every sequence
z 1 , . . . , z n and permutation φ of the integers { 1 , . . . , n } it holds
that 
Pr [ z 1 , . . . , z n ] = Pr [ z φ(1) , . . . , z φ(n ) ] . 
That is, each permutation of a sequence of samples from P is
equally likely. In particular, i.i.d. samples are always exchangeable.
Define the error after seeing n samples at significance level ε as 
err ε n (, ω) = 
{
1 i f y n / ∈ ε ( z 1 , . . . , z n −1  , x n ) , 
0 otherwise. 
The quantities err ε n (, ω) are random variables depending on
ω ~ P ∞ . Exact validity means these variables are all independent
and Bernoulli distributed with parameter ε. Conservative validity
means they are dominated in distribution by independent Bernoulli
random variables. That is, there exist two sequences of random
variables ξ1 , ξ2 , . . . and η1 , η2 , . . . such that 
1. each ξ n is independent and Bernoulli distributed with parame-
ter ε; 
2. err ε n (, ω) ≤ ηn almost surely for all n ; 
3. the joint distribution of η1 , . . . , ηn equals that of ξ1 , . . . , ξn for
all n . 
This implies the following asymptotic conservative validity
property, by the law of large numbers: 
lim 
n →∞ 
1 
n 
n ∑ 
i =1 
err ε i (, ω) ≤ ε almost surely . 
Algorithm 1 is the general conformal prediction algorithm. It
Algorithm 1: The conformal prediction algorithm. 
Input : Non-conformity measure 
, significance level ε, bag 
of examples  z 1 , . . . , z n  ⊆ Z , object x ∈ X 
Output : Prediction region ε ( z 1 , . . . , z n  , x ) 
1 foreach y ∈ Y do 
2 z n +1 ← (x, y ) 
3 for i = 1 , . . . , n + 1 do 
4 αi ← 
( z 1 , . . . , z n  \  z i  , z i ) 
5 end 
6 p y ← 1 n +1 # { i = 1 , . . . , n + 1 | αi ≥ αn +1 } 
7 end 
8 return { y ∈ Y | p y > ε} 
takes as a parameter a non-conformity measure 
. In general,
a non-conformity measure is any measurable real-valued func-
tion which takes a sequence of samples z 1 , . . . , z n along with an
additional sample z and maps them to a non-conformity score

( z 1 , . . . , z n  , z) . This score is intended to measure how much the
sample z differs from the given bag of samples. The conformal pre-
diction algorithm is always conservatively valid regardless of thePlease cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 hoice of non-conformity measure 3 . However, the predictive effi-
iency of the algorithm — that is, the size of the prediction region
ε( B, x ) — can vary considerably with different choices for 
. If
he non-conformity measure is chosen sufficiently poorly, the pre-
iction regions may even be equal to the entirety of Y . Although
his is clearly valid, it is useless from a practical point of view. 
Algorithm 1 determines a prediction region for a new input x ∈
 based on a bag of old samples by iterating over every label y ∈ Y
nd computing an associated p -value p y . This value is the empirical
raction of samples in the bag (including the new “virtual sample”
 x, y )) with a non-conformity score that is at least as large as the
on-conformity score of ( x, y ). By thresholding these p -values we
btain a set of candidate labels y 1 , . . . , y t such that each possible
ombination (x, y 1 ) , . . . , (x, y t ) is “sufficiently conformal” to the old
amples at the given level of confidence. 
.2. Inductive Venn-ABERS predictors 
Of particular interest to us here will be the inductive Venn-
ABERS predictors or IVAPs [11] . These are related to conformal pre-
ictors but they take advantage of the predictive efficiency of some
ther inductive learning rule (such as a neural network or support
ector machine). The IVAP algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2 for
Algorithm 2: The inductive Venn-ABERS prediction algorithm 
for binary classification. 
Input : bag of examples  z 1 , . . . , z n  ⊆ Z , object x ∈ X , 
learning algorithm A 
Output : Pair of probabilities (p 0 , p 1 ) 
1 Divide the bag of training examples  z 1 , . . . , z n  into a proper 
training set  z 1 , . . . , z m  and a calibration set  z m +1 , . . . , z n  . 
2 Run the learning algorithm A on the proper training set to 
obtain a scoring rule F . 
3 foreach example z i = (x i , y i ) in the calibration set do 
4 s i ← F (x i ) 
5 end 
6 s ← F (x ) 
7 Fit isotonic regression to { (s m +1 , y m +1 ) , . . . , (s n , y n ) , (s, 0) } 
obtaining a function f 0 . 
8 Fit isotonic regression to { (s m +1 , y m +1 ) , . . . , (s n , y n ) , (s, 1) } 
obtaining a function f 1 . 
9 (p 0 , p 1 ) ← ( f 0 (s ) , f 1 (s )) 
10 return (p 0 , p 1 ) 
he case of binary classification. The output of the IVAP algo-
ithm is a pair ( p 0 , p 1 ) where 0 ≤ p 0 ≤ p 1 ≤ 1. These quantities
an be interpreted as lower and upper bounds on the probability
r [ y = 1 | x ] , that is, p 0 ≤ Pr [ y = 1 | x ] ≤ p 1 . The width of this in-
erval, p 1 − p 0 , can be used as a reliable measure of confidence in
he prediction. Although Algorithm 2 can only be used for binary
lassification, it is possible to extend it to the multi-class setting
44] . This is left to future work. 
IVAPs are a variant of the conformal prediction algorithm where
he non-conformity measure is based on an isotonic regression of
he scores which the underlying scoring classifier assigns to the
alibration data points as well as the new input to be classified.
sotonic (or monotonic) regression aims to fit a non-decreasing
ree-form line to a sequence of observations such that the line lies
s close to these observations as possible. Fig. 2 shows an example
f isotonic regression applied to a 2D toy data set. adversarial manipulation using inductive Venn-ABERS predictors, 
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Fig. 2. An example of isotonic regression on a 2D data set. The isotonic fit is shown 
as a red line. This image was produced with the isoreg function from the R lan- 
guage [45] . 
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Fig. 3. Example of the greatest convex minorant of a set of points, shown as a red 
line. This image was produced with the fdrtool package [47] . 
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a  In the case of Algorithm 2 , the isotonic regression is performed
s follows. Let s 1 , . . . , s k be the scores assigned to the calibration
oints. First, these points are sorted in increasing order and du-
licates are removed, obtaining a sequence s ′ 1 ≤ · · · ≤ s ′ t . We then
efine the multiplicity of s ′ 
j 
as 
 j = # { i | s i = s ′ j } . 
he “average label” corresponding to some score s ′ 
j 
is 
 
′ 
j = 
1 
w j 
∑ 
i : s i = s ′ j 
y i . 
he cumulative sum diagram (CSD) is computed as the set of
oints 
 i = 
( 
i ∑ 
j=1 
w j , 
i ∑ 
j=1 
y ′ j w j 
) 
= (W i , Y i ) 
or i = 1 , . . . , t . For these points, the greatest convex minorant (GCM)
s computed. Fig. 3 shows an example of a GCM computed for a
iven set of points in the plane. Formally, the GCM of a function
f : U → R is the maximal convex function g : I → R defined on a
losed interval I containing U such that g ( u ) ≤ f ( u ) for all u ∈ U
46] . It can be thought of as the “lowest part” of the convex hull
f the graph of f . 
The value at s ′ 
i 
of the isotonic regression is now defined as the
lope of the GCM between W i −1 and W i . That is, if f is the isotonic
egression and g is the GCM, then 
f (s ′ i ) = 
g(W i ) − g(W i −1 ) 
W i −W i −1 
= g( W i ) − g(W i −1 ) 
w i 
. 
e leave the values of f at other points besides the s ′ 
i 
undefined,
s we will never need them here. 
. Detecting adversarial manipulation using IVAPs 
IVAPs enjoy a type of validity property which we detail here.
 random variable P is said to be perfectly calibrated for another
andom variable Y if the following equality holds almost surely: 
 [ Y | P ] = P. (2)
Please cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 et P 0 , P 1 be random variables representing the output of an IVAP
rained on a set of i.i.d. samples and evaluated on a new random
ample X with label Y ∈ {0, 1}. Then there exists a random variable
 ∈ {0, 1} such that P S is perfectly calibrated for Y . Hence, for each
rediction at least one of the probabilites P 0 , P 1 output by an IVAP
s almost surely equal to the conditional expectation of the label
iven the probability. Since the label is binary, the relation (2) can
e rewritten as 
r [ Y = 1 | P S ] = P S . (3)
q. (3) expresses the validity property for IVAPs. If the difference
p 1 − p 0 is sufficiently small for some instance x , so that p 0 , p 1 ≈ p ,
hen (3) allows us to deduce that x has label 1 with probability
pproximately p . The validity property (3) holds for IVAPs as long
s the data are exchangeable, which is the case whenever the data
re i.i.d. 
Our proposed method for detecting adversarial examples is
ased on these observations: we use p 1 − p 0 as a confidence mea-
ure for the prediction returned by the underlying scoring classifier
nd then return the appropriate label based on these values. The
seudocode is shown in Algorithm 3 . The general idea is to use an
VAP to obtain the probabilities p 0 and p 1 for each test instance
 . If these probabilities lie close enough to each other according
o the precision parameter β , then we assume to have enough
onfidence in our prediction; otherwise, we return a special label
EJECT signifying that we do not trust the output of the classifier
n this particular sample. The precision parameter β is tuned by
aximizing Youden’s index [48] on a held-out validation set con-
isting of clean and adversarial samples. In case we trust our pre-
iction, we use p = p 1 1 −p 0 + p 1 as an estimate of the probability that
he label is 1 (as in Vovk et al. [11] ). If p > 0.5, we return 1; oth-
rwise, we return 0. This method of quantifying uncertainty and
ejecting unreliable predictions was in fact already mentioned in
ovk et al. [11] , but to our knowledge nobody has yet attempted
o use it for protection against adversarial examples. 
An important consideration in the deployment of Algorithm 3 is
he computational complexity of the approach. This is clearly de-
ermined by the underlying machine learning model, as we are re-
uired to run its learning algorithm and perform inference with
he resulting model for each sample in the calibration set as well
s for each new test sample. The overhead caused by the IVAPadversarial manipulation using inductive Venn-ABERS predictors, 
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Algorithm 3: Detecting adversarial manipulation with IVAPs. 
Input : precision β ∈ [0 , 1] , bag of examples  z 1 , . . . , z n  ⊆ Z , 
object x ∈ X , learning algorithm A 
Output : An element of the set Y ∪ { REJECT } . 
1 Use algorithm 2 to compute p 0 , p 1 for x . 
2 if p 1 − p 0 ≤ β then 
3 Set p ← p 1 1 −p 0 + p 1 . 
4 if p > 0 . 5 then 
5 return 1 
6 else 
7 return 0 
8 end 
9 else 
10 return REJECT 
11 end 
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hconstruction consists of the isotonic regressions, which are dom-
inated by the complexity of sorting the samples in the calibration
set, as well as other operations that take linear time. The scores
of the calibration samples can be precomputed and stored for fast
access later, reducing the complexity of the inference step. To sum-
marize, let T A ( n ) and T F ( n ) denote the time complexity of running
the learning algorithm and the scoring rule on a set of n sam-
ples, respectively. Then we can determine the time complexity of
Algorithm 3 as follows for a bag of n samples: 
• Calibration . Initially, when the IVAP is calibrated, we run the
learning algorithm on the proper training set and compute
scores for each of the calibration samples. This takes O(T A (n ) +
T F (n )) time. 
• Inference . To compute the probabilities p 0 , p 1 for a new test
sample, we run the scoring rule and perform two isotonic re-
gressions. This can be done in time O(T F (1) + n log n ) . 
The overhead incurred by the IVAP in the calibration phase
(which only needs to be performed once) is proportional to the
complexity of the learning algorithm and scoring rule when ex-
ecuted on the given bag of samples. When performing inference,
the overhead compared to simply running the underlying model is
log-linear in the size of the calibration set. 
It is also important to consider how the calibration set and the
underlying model affect the performance of the IVAP. To the best
of our knowledge, the existing literature on IVAPs does not provide
quantitative answers to these questions. Vovk et al. [11] note that
the validity property (3) always holds for the IVAP regardless of
the performance of the underlying model, as long as the calibra-
tion set consists of independent samples from the data distribu-
tion. They also point out that, for “large” calibration sets, the differ-
ence p 1 − p 0 will be small. It would be interesting to have uniform
convergence bounds that quantify how quickly p 1 − p 0 converges
to zero as the calibration set grows larger, but we are not aware
of any such results. Most likely, such bounds will depend on the
accuracy of the underlying model, where the convergence is faster
with a more accurate model. 
3.1. White-box attack for IVAPs 
As pointed out by Carlini and Wagner [41] , it is not sufficient to
demonstrate that a new defense is robust against existing attacks.
To make any serious claims of adversarial robustness, we must also
develop and test a white-box attack that was designed to specifi-
cally target models protected with our defense. Let x be any input
that is not rejected and classified as y by the detector. Our attack
must then find ˜ x ∈ X such that Please cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 1. ‖ x − ˜ x‖ p is as small as possible; 
2. ˜ x is not rejected by the detector; 
3. ˜ x is classified as 1 − y . 
Here, ‖ u ‖ p is the general  p norm of the vector u . Common
hoices for p in the literature are p ∈ {1, 2, ∞ } [27] ; we will fo-
us on  2 and  ∞ norms in this work. 
Following Carlini and Wagner [41] , we design a differentiable
unction that is minimized when ˜ x lies close to x , is not rejected
y the detector and is classified as 1 − y . To do this efficiently, note
hat whenever a new sample has the same score as an old sample
n the calibration set, it will have no effect on the isotonic regres-
ion and the result of applying Algorithm 3 to it will be the same
s applying the algorithm to the old sample. Hence, we search for
 sample ( s i , y i ) in the calibration set such that 
1. y i = 1 − y ; 
2. f 1 (s i ) − f 0 (s i ) ≤ β; 
3. the confidence p = f 1 (s i ) 
1 − f 0 (s i )+ f 1 (s i ) satisfies p > 0.5 if y i = 1 and
p ≤ 0.5 otherwise. 
From among all samples that satisfy these conditions, we
hoose the one which minimizes the following expression: 
 x − x i ‖ 2 2 + c(s (x ) − s i ) 2 . 
ere, s ( x ) is the score assigned to x by the classifier and c is a con-
tant which trades off the relative importance of reducing the size
f the perturbation vs fooling the detector. We choose these sam-
les in this way so as to “warm-start” our attack: we seek a sample
hat lies as close as possible to the original x in X -space but also
as a score s i which lies as close as possible to s ( x ). This way, we
ope to minimize the amount of effort required to optimize our
dversarial example. 
Having fixed such a sample ( s i , y i ), we solve the following opti-
ization problem: 
min 
∈ [ −1 , 1] d 
‖ δ‖ 2 2 + c(s (x + δ) − s i ) 2 subject to x + δ ∈ [0 , 1] d . (4)
he constant c can be determined via binary search, as in the Car-
ini & Wagner attack [16] . In our case, we are applying the attack to
 standard neural network without any non-differentiable compo-
ents, meaning the score function s is differentiable. The resulting
roblem (4) can therefore be solved using standard gradient de-
cent methods since the function to be minimized is differentiable
s well. In particular, we use the Adam optimizer [49] to minimize
ur objective function. The constraint x + δ ∈ [0 , 1] d can easily be
nforced by clipping the values of x + δ back into the [0, 1] d hy-
ercube after each iteration of gradient descent. 
Note that our custom white-box attack will not suffer from
ny gradient masking introduced by our defense. Indeed, we only
ely on gradients computed from the underlying machine learning
odel. As long as the unprotected classifier does not mask gradi-
nts (which it should not, since the unprotected classifiers will be
anilla neural networks trained in the standard way), this informa-
ion will be useful. 
As described, the above method of selecting a calibration sam-
le and solving (4) only considers adversarials that are minimal in
 2 distance. However,  ∞ -bounded perturbations are also of inter-
st, so in our experiments we evaluate both the original  2 formu-
ation as well as an  ∞ variant where we replace ‖ · ‖ 2 2 by ‖ · ‖ ∞ . 
. Experiments 
To verify the robustness of Algorithm 3 against adversarial ex-
mples, we perform experiments with several machine learning
lassification tasks. The following questions are of interest to us
ere: adversarial manipulation using inductive Venn-ABERS predictors, 
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Fig. 4. Illustration of the different data splits. The training data is split into proper 
training data on which the scoring classifier is trained and calibration data on 
which the IVAP fits the isotonic regression. The test data is split into proper test 
data, which is used to determine the overall accuracy of the resulting algorithm, 
and validation data. Both of these subsets of test data are used to generate adver- 
sarial proper test data and adversarial validation data. The adversarial proper test 
data is used for evaluating the robustness of the resulting algorithm, whereas the 
adversarial validation data is used together with the validation data to tune β . All 
splits are 80% for the left branch and 20% for the right branch. 
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Table 1 
Summary of performance indicators for the CNNs used in our experiments. 
Task Clean accuracy Adversarial accuracy 
Zeroes vs ones 100% 2.31% 
Cats vs dogs 89.87% 1.8% 
T-shirts vs trousers 99.75% 3.43% 
Airplanes vs automobiles 96.69% 3.75% 
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 1. How does the IVAP handle adversarial examples targeted at the
original model ( Section 4.1 )? Ideally, the IVAP should be im-
mune to these. 
2. Can we generate adversarial examples specifically to bypass the
IVAP ( Sections 4.2 and 4.3 )? As pointed out by Carlini and Wag-
ner [16] , it is not enough for an adversarial defense to be ro-
bust against an oblivious adversary; we must also establish ro-
bustness against an adversary that is aware of our defense. We
therefore adapt existing adversarial attacks to target our detec-
tor and we also evaluate the IVAP against our custom white-box
attack. 
3. How much adversarial data is actually needed in the validation
set ( Section 4.4 )? As it stands, we augment the validation set
with adversarial examples generated by a variety of attacks in
order to tune the β parameter. However, we want our defense
to be robust not only against attacks which it has been exposed
to but also to attacks which have yet to be invented. We there-
fore compare our results to a setting where only one adversarial
attack is used for the validation set. 
The goal of these experiments is to show that the IVAP can han-
le both old and new adversarial examples and that its robustness
eneralizes beyond the limited set of attacks which it has seen. As
uch, we consider a number of different scenarios for each classi-
cation task, detailed below. 
.1. Robustness of the detector to the original adversarial examples 
We run adversarial attack algorithms on both the validation set
nd the proper test set, creating an adversarial validation set and
n adversarial proper test set (see Fig. 4 for details on our different
ata splits). The attacks we employed were projected gradient de-
cent with random restarts [27] , DeepFool [50] , local search [51] ,
he single pixel attack [52] , NewtonFool [53] , fast gradient sign
6] and the momentum iterative method [54] . This means for each 
est set we generate seven new data sets consisting of all the ad-
ersarial examples the attacks were able to find on the test set
or the original model. We then run Algorithm 3 on the adversar-
al validation set as well as the regular validation set. Our goal is
o maximize Youden’s index (defined below) on both the regular
nd adversarial validation sets. We choose β such that this index
s maximized. We can then use the proper test set and the adver-
arial proper test set to judge the clean and adversarial accuracy of
he resulting algorithm with the tuned value of β . 
.2. Robustness of the detector to new adversarial examples 
We attempt to generate new adversarials which take the de-
ector into account and evaluate the performance similarly to thePlease cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 rst scenario. The resulting samples are called adapted adversari-
ls . They are generated by applying all of the adversarial attacks
entioned above to Algorithm 3 . For the gradient-based attacks,
e use the natural evolution strategies approach [34,55] to esti-
ate the gradient, thereby avoiding any possible gradient masking
ssues [32] . 
.3. Fully white-box attack 
We run our custom adversarial attack (4) for the detector on
he entire proper test set and evaluate its performance. This attack
s specifically designed to target the IVAP and should represent an
bsolute worst-case scenario for the defense. 
.4. Ablation study 
We estimate β based on adversarials generated only by the
eepFool method on the validation set for the original model and
hen evaluate the resulting detector as before. The purpose of this
cenario is to estimate how “future-proof” our method is, by eval-
ating its robustness against attacks that played no role in the
uning of β . Our choice for DeepFool was motivated by the ob-
ervations that it is efficient and rather effective, but it is by no
eans the strongest attack in our collection. It is less efficient
han fast gradient sign, but this method was never meant to be
 serious attack; it was only meant to demonstrate excessive lin-
arity of DNNs [6] . It is weaker than NewtonFool, for example,
ince this method utilizes second-order information of the model
hereas DeepFool is limited to first-order approximations. It is also
eaker than some first-order attacks such as the momentum itera-
ive method, which was at the top of the NIPS 2017 adversarial at-
ack competition [54,56] . We therefore feel that DeepFool is a good
hoice for evaluating how robust our defense is to future attacks. 
.5. Metrics 
For all scenarios, we report the accuracy, true prositive rate
TPR), true negative rate (TNR), false positive rate (FPR) and false
egative rate (FNR) of the detectors. These are defined as follows: 
ccuracy = TA + TR 
m 
, TPR = TA 
TA + FR , TNR = 
TR 
TR + FA , 
FPR = FA 
FA + TR , FNR = 
FR 
FR + TA . 
ere, m is the total number of samples, TA is the number of cor-
ect predictions the detector accepted, TR is the number of incor-
ect predictions the detector rejected, FA is the number of incorrect
redictions the detector accepted and FR is the number of correct
redictions the detector rejected. Youden’s index is defined as 
 = TPR + TNR − 1 = TPR − FPR . 
t is defined for every point on a ROC curve. Graphically, it cor-
esponds to the distance between the ROC curve and the random
hance line [48] . 
These metrics are computed for different scenarios: 
• Clean . This refers to the proper test data set, without any mod-
ifications. adversarial manipulation using inductive Venn-ABERS predictors, 
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Table 2 
Summary of performance indicators for the detectors on the different tasks. 
Task Data Size Accuracy TPR TNR FPR FNR 
Zeroes vs ones Clean 1692 98.52% 98.51% 100.0% 0.0% 1.49% 
Adversarial 6918 46.07% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Adapted 5858 97.41% 0.0% 99.06% 0.94% 100.0% 
Custom  2 1692 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Custom  ∞ 1692 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Cats vs dogs Clean 3988 72.94% 75.9% 48.85% 51.15% 24.1% 
Adversarial 22,599 52.56% 71.25% 38.86% 61.14% 28.75% 
Adapted 17,187 59.27% 100.0% 59.18% 40.82% 0.0% 
Custom  2 3952 1.64% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
Custom  ∞ 3145 1.69% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
T-shirts vs trousers Clean 1600 96.88% 96.86% 97.44% 2.56% 3.14% 
Adversarial 7076 50.99% 0.0% 99.97% 0.03% 100.0% 
Adapted 5923 77.53% 0.0% 77.99% 22.01% 100.0% 
Custom  2 1600 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Custom  ∞ 1600 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Airplanes vs automobiles Clean 1600 74.38% 73.21% 96.3% 3.7% 26.79% 
Adversarial 8256 58.14% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Adapted 6586 93.99% 0.0% 94.82% 5.18% 100.0% 
Custom  2 1600 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Custom  ∞ 1600 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c  
2  
c  
I  
o  
m  
c
 
2  
o  
t  
s  
a
 
1  
p  
b
4
 
T  
s  
i  
I  
t  
t  
p  
a  
m  
c  
u  
i  
m  
v  
c  
s  
p  
r
 
o  
s• Adversarial . Here, the metrics are computed on the adversarial
test set. This data set is constructed by running existing ad-
versarial attacks against the underlying neural network on the
proper test set. They do not take the IVAP into account. 
• Adapted . This is similar to the Adversarial scenario but the at-
tacks are modified to take the IVAP into account. 
• Custom  p . Here, we compute the metrics for adversarial ex-
amples generated using our custom  p white-box attack on the
proper test set. We report results for p = 2 and p = ∞ . 
4.6. Implementation details 
The implementations of the adversarial attacks, including the
gradient estimator using the natural evolution strategies, were pro-
vided by the Foolbox library [57] . The implementation of the Venn-
BERS predictor was provided by Toccaceli [58] . The different data
splits we perform for these experiments are illustrated schemati-
cally in Figure 4 . Almost all neural networks were trained for 50
epochs using the Adam optimizer [49] with default parameters in
the Keras framework [59] using the TensorFlow backend [60] . The
exception is the CNN for the cats vs dogs task, which was trained
for 100 epochs. No regularization or data augmentation schemes
were used; the only preprocessing we perform is a normalization
of the input pixels to the [0,1] range as well as resizing the images
in one of the tasks. Descriptions of all the CNN architectures can
be found in Appendix A . 
4.7. Data sets 
Here, we detail the different data sets used for our experiments.
Note that these are all binary classification problems, since the
IVAP construction as formulated by Vovk et al. [11] only works for
binary tasks. Extending the IVAP to multiclass problems has been
discussed, for example, in Manokhin [44] ; using a multiclass IVAP
in adversarial defense will be explored in future work. 
Zeroes vs ones. Our first task is a binary classification problem
based on the MNIST data set [61] . We take the original MNIST
data set and filter out only the images displaying either a zero
or a one. The pixel values are normalized to lie in the interval
[0,1]. We then run our experiments as described above, using a
convolutional neural network (CNN) as the scoring classifier for
Algorithm 3 . Please cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 Cats vs dogs. The second task we consider is the classification of
ats and dogs in the Asirra data set [62] . This data set consists of
5,0 0 0 JPEG color images where half contain dogs and half contain
ats. Again we train a CNN as the scoring classifier for Algorithm 3 .
n the original collection, not all images were of the same size. In
ur experiments, we resized all images to 6 4 × 6 4 pixels and nor-
alized the pixel values to [0,1] to facilitate processing by our ma-
hine learning pipeline. 
T-shirts vs trousers. The third task is classifying whether a
8 × 28 grayscale image contains a picture of a T-shirt or a pair
f trousers. Similarly to the MNIST zeroes vs ones task, we take
he Fashion-MNIST data set [63] and filter out the pictures of T-
hirts and trousers. Again, the pixel values are normalized to [0,1]
nd a CNN is used for this classification problem. 
Airplanes vs automobiles. Our fourth task is based on the CIFAR-
0 data set [30] , which consists of 60,0 0 0 RGB images 32 × 32
ixels in size. We filter out the images of airplanes and automo-
iles and train a CNN to distinguish these two classes. 
.8. Results and discussion 
The baseline accuracies of the unprotected CNNs are given in
able 1 for the different tasks. We can see that they perform rea-
onably accurately on clean test data, but as expected the adversar-
al accuracy is very low. Table 2 gives the clean accuracies of the
VAPs for each of the tasks. From these results, we can see that
he clean accuracy of the protected model invariably suffers from
he addition of the IVAP. However, in almost all tasks, the false
ositive and false negative rates are relatively low. Our detectors
re therefore capable of accepting correct predictions and rejecting
istaken ones from the underlying model on clean data. The ex-
eption is the cats vs dogs task, where the false positive rate is un-
sually high at 51.15%. However, we believe these results might be
mproved by using a better underlying CNN. In our initial experi-
ents, we used the same CNN for this task as we did for airplanes
s automobiles and trained it for only 50 epochs. Using a more
omplex CNN and training it longer significantly improved the re-
ults, so we are optimistic that the results we obtained can be im-
roved even further by adapting the underlying CNN and training
egime. 
The results presented here are observations from a single run of
ur experiments. Multiple runs of the experiments did not produce
ignificantly different results. adversarial manipulation using inductive Venn-ABERS predictors, 
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Fig. 5. The ROC curves for the different detectors. The orange dashed line is the random chance line. The red solid line is the ROC curve for our detector. The dotted black 
line is the cut-off corresponding to the optimal value of β , which is defined here as the value that maximizes Youden’s index. 
Fig. 6. Selections of adversarial examples which can fool our detectors, generated 
by the custom  2 white-box attack. 
 
l  
i  
Fig. 7. Selections of adversarial examples which can fool our detectors, generated 
by the custom  ∞ white-box attack. 
a  
o  
i  Robustness to existing attacks. The first question we would
ike to answer when evaluating any novel adversarial defense
s whether it can defend against existing attacks that were notPlease cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 dapted specifically to fool it. This is a bare minimum of strength
ne desires: if existing attacks can already break the defense, then
t is useless. In Table 2 , we evaluate our IVAP defense against theadversarial manipulation using inductive Venn-ABERS predictors, 
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Fig. 8. Selections of adversarial examples which can fool our ablated detectors, gen- 
erated by the custom  2 white-box attack. 
Fig. 9. Selections of adversarial examples which can fool our ablated detectors, gen- 
erated by the custom  ∞ white-box attack. 
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4 Madry et al. stress that the  ∞ variant be used and not, e.g., an  2 one. We 
follow their advice and perform adversarial training exclusively with the  ∞ version. 
The implementation we used was taken directly from https://github.com/MadryLab/ 
mnist _ challenge . suite of attacks described in Section 4.1 . The results are shown for
the Adversarial and Adapted scenarios. When we transfer adversar-
ials generated for the underlying model to the IVAP, the accuracy
always degrades significantly. However, it is important to note that
all unprotected CNNs have very low accuracy on these samples.
As such, in almost all cases, the IVAP has a very high true nega-
tive rate as most predictions are in error. The exception is the cats
vs dogs task, where the true negative rate is rather low on the
transferred adversarials. The accuracy is still much higher than the
unprotected model, though (52.56% vs 1.8%), so the IVAP did sig-
nificantly improve the robustness against this transfer attack. The
adversarials generated using existing attacks adapted to the pres-
ence of the IVAP also degrade the accuracy, but not as severely as
the transfer attack. True negative rates remain high across all tasks
and the level of accuracy is, at the very least, much better than
without IVAP protection. 
Robustness to novel attacks. To more thoroughly evaluate the
strength of our defense, it is necessary to also test it against an
adaptive adversary utilizing an attack that is specifically designed
to circumvent our defense. For this reason, Table 2 also shows
two rows of test results for each task, where we run our custom
white-box attack for both the  2 and  ∞ norms. At first glance,
it appears as though our attack is completely successful and fully
breaks our defense, yielding 0% accuracy. To investigate this fur-
ther, Figs. 6 and 7 show random selections of five adversarial ex-
amples that managed to fool the different detectors, generated by
our white-box attack. Empirical cumulative distributions of the dis-
tortion levels introduced by our white-box attack are shown in
Figs. 10 and 11 . Visually inspecting the generated adversarials and
looking at the distributions of the distortion levels reveals cause
for optimism: although some perturbations are still visually im-
perceptible, there is a significant increase in the overall distortion
required to fool the detectors. This is especially the case for the
 ∞ adversarials, where almost all perturbations are obvious. Even
the  2 adversarials are generally very unsubtle except for the ones
generated on the cats vs dogs task. We believe this is due to the
fact that the Asirra images are larger than the CIFAR-10 images
(64 × 64 vs 32 × 32), so that the  2 perturbations can be more
“spread out” across the pixels. Regardless, if one compares the ad-
versarial images to the originals, the perturbations are still obvious
because the adversarials are unusually grainy and blurred. Please cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 Sensitivity of hyperparameters. For the experiments carried out
n Table 2 , the IVAP was only exposed to adversarial attacks which
t had already seen: the rejection threshold β was tuned on sam-
les perturbed using the same adversarial attacks as it was then
ested against. Fig. 5 shows the ROC curves for the different de-
ectors along with the optimal thresholds. An important question
hat arises now is how well the IVAP fares if we test it against
ttacks that differ from the ones used to tune its hyperparame-
ers, since in practice it is doubtful that we will be able to an-
icipate what attacks an adversary may use. Moreover, even if we
an anticipate this, the set of possible attacks may be so large as
o make it computationally infeasible to use them all. Therefore,
e also test the performance of the IVAP when β is tuned on ad-
ersarials generated only by the DeepFool attack instead of the full
uite of attacks. We obtained identical values of β for the Zeroes vs
nes and Cats vs dogs tasks. The results for the other tasks where
was different are shown in Table 3 . The conclusions are simi-
ar: the accuracy degrades both on clean and adversarial data, but
lean accuracy is still high and true negative rates are high on ad-
ersarial data. The custom white-box attack again appears highly
uccessful. Figs. 12 and 13 plot the empirical cumulative distribu-
ions of the adversarial distortion levels for the ablated detectors
nd Figs. 8 and 9 show selections of custom white-box adversar-
als which fooled the ablated detectors. These results show that
obustness to our  2 white-box attack is significantly lower com-
ared to the non-ablated detectors. The  ∞ -bounded perturbations
re still very noticable, however. As an illustrative example, Fig. 14
hows histograms of the differences p 1 − p 0 between the upper
nd lower probabilities for clean and DeepFool adversarial exam-
les on the zeroes vs ones task. Although there is a small amount
f overlap, the vast majority of adversarial examples have a much
igher difference than clean samples: clean data has a difference
lose to 0%, whereas adversarials are almost always close to 50%.
he tuned model threshold is placed so that the majority of clean
amples are still allowed through but virtually all adversarials are
ejected. 
. Comparison with other methods 
In this section, we compare our IVAP method to the Madry de-
ense [27] which, to the best of our knowledge, is the strongest
tate-of-the-art defense at the time of this writing. Specifically, we
pply the Madry defense to each of the CNNs used in the tasks
rom Section 4 and compare the accuracies of the different meth-
ds. We also perform transfer attacks where we try to fool our
VAP using adversarials generated for the Madry defense and vice
ersa. 
The Madry defense is a form of adversarial training where, at
ach iteration of the learning algorithm, the  ∞ projected gradient
escent attack is used to perturb all samples in the current mini-
atch 4 . The model is then updated based on this perturbed batch
nstead of the original. To facilitate fair comparison, we do not use
he pre-trained models and weights published by Madry et al. for
he MNIST and CIFAR-10 data sets, since these are meant for the
ull 10-class problems whereas our defense only considers a sim-
ler binary subproblem. Rather, we modified the network architec-
ures for these tasks so they correspond to our own CNNs from
ection 4 and trained them according to the procedure outlined by
adry et al. [27] . 
Table 4 shows the results we obtained with the Madry defense
s well as the parameter settings we used for the PGD attack. Theadversarial manipulation using inductive Venn-ABERS predictors, 
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Fig. 10. Empirical cumulative distributions of the adversarial distortion produced by our  2 white-box attack. The distance metrics are  2 (left) and  ∞ (right). 
Fig. 11. Empirical cumulative distributions of the adversarial distortion produced by our  ∞ white-box attack. The distance metrics are  2 (left) and  ∞ (right). 
Table 3 
Summary of performance indicators for the ablated detectors on the different tasks. 
Task Data Size Accuracy TPR TNR FPR FNR 
T-shirts vs trousers Clean 1,600 97.81% 97.89% 94.87% 5.13% 2.11% 
Adversarial 7,076 49.31% 3.81% 93.02% 6.98% 96.19% 
Adapted 5,901 56.8% 0.0% 56.93% 43.07% 100.0% 
Custom  2 1,600 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Custom  ∞ 1,600 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Airplanes vs automobiles Clean 1,600 93.62% 95.39% 60.49% 39.51% 4.61% 
Adversarial 8,256 52.63% 0.0% 90.52% 9.48% 100.0% 
Adapted 6,580 69.18% 0.0% 69.73% 30.27% 100.0% 
Custom  2 1,600 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Custom  ∞ 1,598 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 4 
Summary of parameters and performance indicators for the Madry defense on the 
machine learning tasks we considered. Step sizes were always set to 0.01 and ran- 
dom start was used each time. 
Task Clean accuracy Adversarial accuracy ε Steps 
Zeroes vs ones 99.88% 97.1% 0.3 40 
Cats vs dogs 54.94% 3.5% 0.3 10 
T-shirts vs trousers 97.12% 85% 0.3 40 
Airplanes vs automobiles 82.06% 29.19% 0.3 10 
d  
t  
i  
Table 5 
Results of the Madry-to-IVAP transfer attack, where adversarial examples generated 
for the Madry defense were tested against our IVAPs. 
Task Accuracy TPR TNR FPR FNR 
Zeroes vs ones 36.05% 30.91% 100.0% 0.0% 69.09% 
Cats vs dogs 61.64% 65.08% 52.3% 47.7% 34.92% 
T-shirts vs trousers 72.75% 71.02% 84.47% 15.53% 28.98% 
Airplanes vs automobiles 45.81% 34.53% 95.92% 4.08% 65.47% 
a  
v  
aefense performs very well on the zeroes vs ones and T-shirts vs
rousers tasks. However, on airplanes vs automobiles the adversar-
al accuracy is low and on the cats vs dogs task both the clean andPlease cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 dversarial accuracies are low. In fact, for the latter task, the ad-
ersarial accuracy is almost the same as if no defense was applied
t all. adversarial manipulation using inductive Venn-ABERS predictors, 
12 J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys / Neurocomputing xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: NEUCOM [m5G; April 23, 2020;18:15 ] 
Fig. 12. Empirical cumulative distributions of the adversarial distortion produced by our  2 white-box attack on the ablated detectors. The distance metrics are  2 (left) and 
 ∞ (right). 
Fig. 13. Empirical cumulative distributions of the adversarial distortion produced by our  ∞ white-box attack on the ablated detectors. The distance metrics are  2 (left) and 
 ∞ (right). 
Fig. 14. Histograms of the differences p 1 − p 0 for clean and adversarial data along 
with the tuned model threshold β . We used the DeepFool attack here to generate 
adversarials for the zeroes vs ones model. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Results of the IVAP-to-Madry transfer attack. Here, adversarial examples generated 
for the IVAP defense by our custom white-box attack are transferred to the Madry 
defense. We test adversarials generated by both the  2 and  ∞ variants of our at- 
tack. 
Task Accuracy (  2 ) Accuracy (  ∞ ) 
Zeroes vs ones 46.28% 66.78% 
Cats vs dogs 55.26% 55.48% 
T-shirts vs trousers 94.94% 93.88% 
Airplanes vs automobiles 79.94% 78.38% 
o  
a  
f
 
t  
z  
b  
v  
d  
f  
f
 
tIn Table 6 we transfer the white-box adversarials for our de-
fense to the Madry defense. The Madry defense appears quite ro-
bust to our IVAP adversarials for T-shirts vs trousers and airplanes
vs automobiles, but much less so on zeroes vs ones. The accuracyPlease cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 n the adversarials for the cats vs dogs task is close to the clean
ccuracy, so these appear to have little effect on the Madry de-
ense. 
Table 5 shows what happens when we transfer adversarials for
he Madry defense to our IVAP detectors. We observe that for the
eroes vs ones and airplanes vs automobiles, the accuracy drops
elow 50%. However, false positive rates on these adversarials are
ery low, so the detectors successfully reject many incorrect pre-
ictions. On the other tasks, accuracy remains relatively high. The
alse positive rate is rather high for the cats vs dogs task, but low
or T-shirts vs trousers. 
Fig. 15 plots the empirical distributions of the adversarial dis-
ortion levels of the Madry adversarials, both for the  and  ∞ 2 
adversarial manipulation using inductive Venn-ABERS predictors, 
J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys / Neurocomputing xxx (xxxx) xxx 13 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: NEUCOM [m5G; April 23, 2020;18:15 ] 
Fig. 15. Empirical cumulative distribution curves for the adversarial distortion of the Madry adversarials. 
Fig. 16. Selections of adversarial examples which can fool the Madry defense, gen- 
erated by the  ∞ PGD attack. 
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iistances. Comparing this figure with Figs. 10 and 11 , we see that
ur custom white-box adversarials for the IVAP defense generally
equire higher  2 and  ∞ levels of distortion than the Madry ad-
ersarials. Fig. 16 plots selections of adversarials generated for the
adry defenses by the  ∞ PGD attack. The visual levels of distor-
ion appear comparable to our defense (for the  ∞ variant of our
ttack), except in the case of the cats vs dogs task where the per-
urbations for the Madry defense seem much larger. It is important
o note, however, that the performance of the Madry defense on
his task is close to random guessing, whereas the IVAP still ob-
ains over 70% clean accuracy. 
We are lead to the conclusion that our defense in fact achieves
igher robustness on these tasks than the Madry defense. More-
ver, our defense appears to scale much better: adversarially train-
ng a deep CNN with  ∞ projected gradient descent quickly be-
omes computationally intractable as the data increase in dimen-
ionality and the CNN increases in complexity. On the other hand,
ur IVAP defense can take an existing CNN (trained using efficient,
tandard methods) and quickly augment it with uncertainty esti-
ates based on a calibration set and a data set of adversarials
or the underlying model. The resulting algorithm appears to re-
uire higher levels of distortion than the Madry defense in order
o be fooled effectively and it seems to achieve higher clean and
dversarial accuracy on more realistic tasks. Finally, we note that
ur method introduces only a single extra scalar parameter, thePlease cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 hreshold β , which can be easily manually tuned if desired. It is
lso possible to tune β based on other objectives than Youden’s
ndex which was used here. On the other hand, the Madry defense
equires a potentially lengthy adversarial training procedure when-
ver the defense’s parameters are modified. 
. Conclusion 
We have proposed using inductive Venn-ABERS predictors
IVAPs) to protect machine learning models against adversarial ma-
ipulation of input data. Our defense uses the width of the uncer-
ainty interval produced by the IVAP as a measure of confidence
n the prediction of the underlying model, where the prediction
s rejected in case this interval is too wide. The acceptable width
s a hyperparameter of the algorithm which can be estimated us-
ng a validation set. The resulting algorithm is no longer vulnera-
le to the original adversarial examples that fooled the unprotected
odel and attacks which take the detector into account have very
imited success. We do not believe this success to be due to gradi-
nt masking, as the defense remains robust even when subjected
o attacks that do not suffer from this phenomenon. Our method
ppears to be competitive to the defense proposed by Madry et al.
27] , which is state-of-the-art at the time of this writing. 
The algorithm proposed here is limited to binary classification
roblems. However, there exist methods to extend the IVAP to the
ulticlass setting [44] . Our future work will focus on using these
echniques to generalize our detector to multiclass classification
roblems. 
Of course, the mere fact that our own white-box attack fails
gainst the IVAP defense does not constitute hard proof that our
ethod is successful. We therefore invite the community to scruti-
ize our defense and to attempt to develop stronger attacks against
t. Our code is available at https://github.com/saeyslab/binary-ivap .
he performance of the IVAP defense is still not ideal at this stage
ince clean accuracy is noticeably reduced. However, we believe
hese findings represent a significant step forward. As such, we
uggest that the community further look into methods from the
eld of conformal prediction in order to achieve adversarial robust-
ess at scale. To our knowledge, we are the first to apply these
ethods to this problem, although the idea has been mentioned
lsewhere already [64, Section 9.3, p133] . 
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Appendix A. Description of the Neural Networks 
In this section, we give detailed descriptions of the CNNs used
in our experiments. These descriptions are Python code for the
Keras framework. Note that we assume the following imports have
been loaded: 
A1. Zeroes vs ones 
A2. Cats vs dogs Please cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 adversarial manipulation using inductive Venn-ABERS predictors, 
J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys / Neurocomputing xxx (xxxx) xxx 15 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: NEUCOM [m5G; April 23, 2020;18:15 ] 
A
A
R
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3. T-shirts vs trousers 
4. Airplanes vs automobiles 
eferences 
[1] Y. LeCun , Y. Bengio , G. Hinton , Deep learning, Nature 521 (7553) (2015) 436 . 
[2] J. Schmidhuber , Deep learning in neural networks: an overview, Neural Netw.
61 (2015) 85–117 . 
[3] J. Deng , W. Dong , R. Socher , L.-J. Li , K. Li , L. Fei-Fei , Imagenet: a large-scale
hierarchical image database, in: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Com-
puter Vision and Pattern Recognition, Ieee, 2009, pp. 248–255 . 
[4] J. Platt , Probabilistic outputs for support vector machines and comparisons to
regularized likelihood methods, Adv. Large Margin Classif. 10 (3) (1999) 61–74 .
[5] Y. Gal , Uncertainty in Deep Learning, University of Cambridge (2016) . 
[6] I.J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, C. Szegedy, Explaining and harnessing adversarial ex-
amples, CoRR, abs/ 1412.6572 (2015). 
[7] A. Nguyen , J. Yosinski , J. Clune , Deep neural networks are easily fooled: High
confidence predictions for unrecognizable images, in: Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2015, pp. 427–436 . 
[8] G. Shafer , A. Gammerman , V. Vovk , Algorithmic Learning in a Random World,
Springer, 2005 . 
[9] A. Gammerman , V. Vovk , Hedging predictions in machine learning, Comput. J.
50 (2) (2007) 151–163 . 
[10] G. Shafer , V. Vovk , A tutorial on conformal prediction, J. Mach. Learn. Res. 9
(Mar) (2008) 371–421 . Please cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 [11] V. Vovk , I. Petej , V. Fedorova , Large-scale probabilistic predictors with and
without guarantees of validity, in: Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, 2015, pp. 892–900 . 
[12] N. Dalvi , P. Domingos , Mausam , S. Sanghai , D. Verma , Adversarial classification,
in: Proceedings of the Tenth ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowl-
edge Discovery and Data Mining, ACM, 2004, pp. 99–108 . 
[13] M. Barreno , B. Nelson , R. Sears , A.D. Joseph , J.D. Tygar , Can machine learning
be secure? in: Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Information, Computer
and Communications Security, ACM, 2006, pp. 16–25 . 
[14] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. Goodfellow, R. Fer-
gus, Intriguing properties of neural networks, arXiv: 1312.6199 (2013). 
[15] B. Biggio , F. Roli , Wild patterns: Ten years after the rise of adversarial machine
learning, Pattern Recognit. 84 (2018) 317–331 . 
[16] N. Carlini , D. Wagner , Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks,
in: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), IEEE,
2017, pp. 39–57 . 
[17] N. Papernot , P. McDaniel , I. Goodfellow , S. Jha , Z.B. Celik , A. Swami , Practical
black-box attacks against machine learning, in: Proceedings of the ACM Asia
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, in: ASIA CCS ’17, ACM,
2017, pp. 506–519 . 
[18] Z. Gong, W. Wang, W.-S. Ku, Adversarial and clean data are not twins,
arXiv: 1704.04960 (2017). adversarial manipulation using inductive Venn-ABERS predictors, 
16 J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys / Neurocomputing xxx (xxxx) xxx 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: NEUCOM [m5G; April 23, 2020;18:15 ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 [19] D. Hendrycks, K. Gimpel, Early methods for detecting adversarial images,
arXiv: 1608.00530 (2016). 
[20] K. Grosse, P. Manoharan, N. Papernot, M. Backes, P. McDaniel, On the (statisti-
cal) detection of adversarial examples, arXiv: 1702.06280 (2017). 
[21] X. Li , F. Li , Adversarial examples detection in deep networks with convolutional
filter statistics., in: Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer
Vision (ICCV), 2017, pp. 5775–5783 . 
[22] S. Gu, L. Rigazio, Towards deep neural network architectures robust to adver-
sarial examples, arXiv: 1412.5068 (2014). 
[23] F. Liao , M. Liang , Y. Dong , T. Pang , J. Zhu , X. Hu , Defense against adversar-
ial attacks using high-level representation guided denoiser, in: Proceedings
of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2018,
pp. 1778–1787 . 
[24] A . Graese , A . Rozsa , T.E. Boult , Assessing threat of adversarial examples on
deep neural networks, in: Proceedings of the 15th IEEE International Con-
ference on Machine Learning and Applications (ICMLA), IEEE, 2016, pp. 69–
74 . 
[25] M. Osadchy , J. Hernandez-Castro , S. Gibson , O. Dunkelman , D. Pérez-Cabo , No
bot expects the DeepCAPTCHA! Introducing immutable adversarial examples,
with applications to CAPTCHA generation, IEEE Trans. Inf. Forens. Secur. 12 (11)
(2017) 2640–2653 . 
[26] M. Cisse, P. Bojanowski, E. Grave, Y. Dauphin, N. Usunier, Parseval networks:
improving robustness to adversarial examples, arXiv: 1704.08847 (2017). 
[27] A . Madry , A . Makelov , L. Schmidt , D. Tsipras , A. Vladu , Towards deep learn-
ing models resistant to adversarial attacks, in: Proceedings of the International
Conference on Learning Representations, 2018 . 
[28] F. Tramèr, A. Kurakin, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, D. Boneh, P. McDaniel, En-
semble adversarial training: attacks and defenses, arXiv: 1705.07204 (2017). 
[29] I. Goodfellow, Defense against the dark arts: an overview of adversarial exam-
ple security research and future research directions, arXiv: 1806.04169 (2018). 
[30] A. Krizhevsky , G. Hinton , Learning multiple layers of features from tiny images,
Technical Report, Citeseer, 2009 . 
[31] B. Graham, Fractional max-pooling, arXiv: 1412.6071 (2014). 
[32] A. Athalye, N. Carlini, D. Wagner, Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of
security: circumventing defenses to adversarial examples, arXiv: 1802.00420
(2018). 
[33] W. Brendel, J. Rauber, M. Bethge, Decision-based adversarial attacks: reliable
attacks against black-box machine learning models, arXiv: 1712.04248 (2017). 
[34] A . Ilyas, L. Engstrom, A . Athalye, J. Lin, Black-box adversarial attacks with lim-
ited queries and information, arXiv: 1804.08598 (2018). 
[35] L. Smith, Y. Gal, Understanding measures of uncertainty for adversarial exam-
ple detection, arXiv: 1803.08533 (2018). 
[36] A. Rawat, M. Wistuba, M.-I. Nicolae, Adversarial phenomenon in the eyes of
Bayesian deep learning, arXiv: 1711.08244 (2017). 
[37] R. Feinman, R.R. Curtin, S. Shintre, A.B. Gardner, Detecting adversarial samples
from artifacts, arXiv: 1703.00410 (2017). 
[38] Y. Li, Y. Gal, Dropout inference in Bayesian neural networks with alpha-
divergences, arXiv: 1703.02914 (2017). 
[39] C. Zhang, J. Butepage, H. Kjellstrom, S. Mandt, Advances in variational infer-
ence, arXiv: 1711.05597 (2017). 
[40] D.A. Fraser , Is Bayes posterior just quick and dirty confidence? Stat. Sci. 26 (3)
(2011) 299–316 . 
[41] N. Carlini , D. Wagner , Adversarial examples are not easily detected: bypassing
ten detection methods, in: Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial
Intelligence and Security, ACM, 2017, pp. 3–14 . 
[42] Y.S. Jonathan Peck Bart Goossens , Detecting adversarial examples with induc-
tive Venn-ABERS predictors, in: Proceedings of the European Symposium on
Artificial Neural Networks, Computational Intelligence and Machine Learning,
2019, pp. 143–148 . 
[43] L. Wasserman , Frasian inference, Stat. Sci. (2011) 322–325 . 
[44] V. Manokhin , Multi-class probabilistic classification using inductive and cross
Venn–Abers predictors, in: Conformal and Probabilistic Prediction and Appli-
cations, 2017, pp. 228–240 . 
[45] R Core Team, R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing, R
Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria, 2015. 
[46] H. Tuy , Convex Analysis and Global Optimization, Springer, 1998 . 
[47] B. Klaus, K. Strimmer, FDRTOOL: Estimation of (Local) False Discovery Rates
and Higher Criticism, 2015. R package version 1.2.15. 
[48] W.J. Youden , Index for rating diagnostic tests, Cancer 3 (1) (1950) 32–35 . 
[49] D.P. Kingma, J. Ba, Adam: a method for stochastic optimization, arXiv: 1412.
6980 (2014). 
[50] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli , A. Fawzi , P. Frossard , DeepFool: a simple and accurate
method to fool deep neural networks, in: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2016, pp. 2574–2582 . 
[51] N. Narodytska, S.P. Kasiviswanathan, Simple black-box adversarial perturba-
tions for deep networks, arXiv: 1612.06299 (2016). 
[52] J. Su, D.V. Vargas, S. Kouichi, One pixel attack for fooling deep neural networks,
arXiv: 1710.08864 (2017). Please cite this article as: J. Peck, B. Goossens and Y. Saeys, Detecting 
Neurocomputing, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2019.11.113 [53] U. Jang , X. Wu , S. Jha , Objective metrics and gradient descent algorithms for
adversarial examples in machine learning, in: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual
Computer Security Applications Conference, ACM, 2017, pp. 262–277 . 
[54] Y. Dong, F. Liao, T. Pang, H. Su, J. Zhu, X. Hu, J. Li, Boosting adversarial attacks
with momentum, (2018). 
[55] D. Wierstra , T. Schaul , T. Glasmachers , Y. Sun , J. Peters , J. Schmidhuber , Natural
evolution strategies, J. Mach. Learn. Res. 15 (2014) 949–980 . 
[56] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, S. Bengio, Y. Dong, F. Liao, M. Liang, T. Pang, J. Zhu,
X. Hu, C. Xie, J. Wang, Z. Zhang, Z. Ren, A. Yuille, S. Huang, Y. Zhao, Y. Zhao, Z.
Han, J. Long, Y. Berdibekov, T. Akiba, S. Tokui, M. Abe, Adversarial attacks and
defences competition, arXiv: 1804.0 0 097 (2018). 
[57] J. Rauber, W. Brendel, M. Bethge, Foolbox: A Python toolbox to benchmark the
robustness of machine learning models, arXiv: 1707.04131 (2017). 
[58] P. Toccaceli, Venn-ABERS Predictor, 2017, ( https://github.com/ptocca/
VennABERS ). Accessed: 25 September 2018. 
[59] F. Chollet, et al., Keras, 2015, ( https://keras.io ). 
[60] M. Abadi, A. Agarwal, P. Barham, E. Brevdo, Z. Chen, C. Citro, G.S. Corrado, A.
Davis, J. Dean, M. Devin, S. Ghemawat, I. Goodfellow, A. Harp, G. Irving, M. Is-
ard, Y. Jia, R. Jozefowicz, L. Kaiser, M. Kudlur, J. Levenberg, D. Mané, R. Monga,
S. Moore, D. Murray, C. Olah, M. Schuster, J. Shlens, B. Steiner, I. Sutskever, K.
Talwar, P. Tucker, V. Vanhoucke, V. Vasudevan, F. Viégas, O. Vinyals, P. War-
den, M. Wattenberg, M. Wicke, Y. Yu, X. Zheng, TensorFlow: Large-scale ma-
chine learning on heterogeneous systems, 2015, Software available from ten-
sorflow.org. 
[61] Y. LeCun, The MNIST database of handwritten digits, 1998, ( http://yann.lecun.
com/exdb/mnist/ ). Accessed: 25 September 2018. 
[62] J. Elson , J.J. Douceur , J. Howell , J. Saul , Asirra: a CAPTCHA that exploits in-
terest-aligned manual image categorization, in: Proceedings of the 14th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), ACM, 2007 . 
[63] H. Xiao, K. Rasul, R. Vollgraf, Fashion-MNIST: a novel image dataset for bench-
marking machine learning algorithms, arXiv: 1708.07747 (2017). 
[64] Y. Vorobeychik , M. Kantarcioglu , Adversarial machine learning, Synthes. Lect.
Artif. Intell. Mach. Learni. 12 (3) (2018) 1–169 . 
Jonathan Peck received the B.Sc. degree in Computer Sci-
ence and M.Sc. in Mathematical Informatics at Ghent Uni-
versity, Belgium, in 2015 and 2017 respectively. He is cur-
rently pursuing a Ph.D. at Ghent University, sponsored by
a fellowship of the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO).
His research focuses on improving the robustness of ma-
chine learning models to adversarial manipulations. 
Bart Goossens is a professor at Ghent University (depart-
ment TELIN/IPI/imec), in the field of digital image pro-
cessing. He obtained the M.Sc. degree in Computer Sci-
ence in 2006 and a Ph.D. in Engineering in 2010 at Ghent
University. His research focuses on digital restoration of
images and video, noise modeling and estimation, super-
resolution and medical image reconstruction. 
Yvan Saeys graduated as a computer scientist from Ghent
University in 20 0 0, and obtained his PhD in computer
science at the Bioinformatics group of the Flemish In-
stitute for Biotechnology (VIB) and Ghent University. He
established the DAMBI research group at the Inflamma-
tion Research Centre (IRC), focusing on the development
and application of new data mining and machine learn-
ing techniques for biomedicine. His research focuses on
the interplay between computer science and biology and
medicine, particularly the tailored design of state-of-the-
art computational techniques for specific biological or
medical questions. adversarial manipulation using inductive Venn-ABERS predictors, 
